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Delivery rights to a cooperative's marketing pool can take on a value independent 
of the members' equity share under certain conditions. Based on anecdotal infor­
mation, transferable delivery rights become valuable when the pool is fixed in size 
(closed), members are protected from exploitation of quasi economic rents, and 
have an assured "home" for their production. The greater the potential buyers' 
aversion to risk, the higher the value of the delivery right. The right has additional 
value if the cooperative generates a premium per unit return due to product 
differentiation and market power. Cooperatives competing with investor-owned 
firms in less than purely competitive markets must be able to pay equal net returns 
to members if they are to survive. 
Introduction 
One ofthe unique characteristics and principles of the cooperative form 
of business is that members l provide the equity capital with which the 
assets of the cooperative are financed, Traditionally, marketing coopera­
tives obtain equity capital by deducting and retaining a small percentage 
of the net proceeds due the member obtained by marketing a member's 
commodity. At the time of exit from a cooperative, the cooperative member 
is typically refunded the equity capital over some period of time valued in 
the same manner as that in which it was paid, Le" the book value of the 
cooperative. The member has, in essence, made a non-interest bearing 
subordinated loan to the cooperative based on either the use of the cooper­
ative or a share of the cooperative's capacity. Thus, the member is not an 
investor in the traditional sense of an investor-owned firm (IOF) in that 
no appreciation of the cooperative's value is paid to the member. 
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Schrader (1989) pointed out a strong desire on the part of cooperative 
members to increase the liquidity of their cooperative stock, especially as 
the members approach retirement. This created an incentive on the part 
of some cooperative members to attempt to restructure the cooperative in 
order to increase the stock liqUidity. One method could be to sell the 
cooperative to private investors at the cooperative's market value if this 
value is in excess of book value (see Staatz 1987). 
An alternative to selling the cooperative to private investors is to create 
a member property right based on the contractual right to deliver commod­
ity to the cooperative and to allow members a limited right to sell and 
transfer this asset to other members or non-members under the condition 
that they obtain membership in the cooperative. This asset is separate 
and distinct from cooperative stock ownership and thus is separated from 
the equity contribution that a member makes to a cooperative. 
A small number of cooperatives have created and recognized such an 
asset for their members. Secondary markets have been created that allow 
these delivery rights to be sold and transferred among the cooperative's 
members. There exists no direct cooperative intervention in these second­
ary markets although the cooperatives often provide information concern­
ing the availability of these assets to members and non-members alike. 
The market exchange for these transferable delivery rights (TDR) is quite 
often the rural coffee shop. 
Objectives 
The primary objective of this study was to investigate how TDRs are 
valued in the secondary market. Specifically, the objectives were to: 
1. Identity conditions under which a TDR can have value 
2. Evaluate differing sources ofTDR value 
Procedure 
There are a number of California and Pacific Northwest marketing coop­
eratives where secondary markets for TDRs have developed. Several of 
these cooperatives were contacted and asked to participate in this study. 
Three cooperatives agreed to participate. They provided the names ofmem­
bers who recently concluded transactions in the TDR secondary market. 
A questionnaire was developed to elicit information on the factors that 
influenced the valuation of the TDR from the member's perspective. Per­
sonal interviews were conducted with 90 percent of the members who had 
bought or sold TDRs in 1992 and 1993. However, the sample size was 
considered too small and the cooperatives too heterogeneous to apply any 
time series or cross section statistical models to the data. All the empirical 
data uscd in this study is therefore anecdotal, and caution should be used 
in generalizing the results. 
Secondary Markets for Cooperative Transferable 
Delivery Rights 
The total delivery volume represented by a cooperative's TDRs is a func­
tion of the size of the cooperative's marketing pool. The original size of 
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the marketing pool is established by the cooperative using market and 
financial criteria. Each current member is then issued a proportion of the 
pool as a delivery right referred to as production base or simply base. 
The proportion received by the current member is typically based on the 
delivery history ofthe member. Each subsequent marketing year the coop­
erative, based on forecast demand and capacity utilization, determines 
the percentage of base that can be delivered by a member. If base is set 
at less than 100 percent of the initial base, producers must adjust their 
production of the commodity. If market conditions and capacity warrant 
an increase in the marketing pool, existing members receive additional 
base on a pro-rata basis. 
A secondary market for TORs is formed between sellers of TORs who 
are current members of the cooperative and deliver commodity to the pool 
and other producers of that commodity who are either current members 
wishing to expand the amount of commodity they are delivering to the 
marketing pool or non-members who want to become members and deliver 
commodity to the marketing pool. It is postulated that the following set of 
conditions are necessary to form and sustain a secondary market in TORs: 
1.	 The TORs are perceived to have value by the potential buyers 
2.	 There are willing sellers 
3.	 Transaction costs are small relative to the perceived value of the TOR 
4.	 Cooperative membership and crop pools are closed 
5.	 There are cooperative by-laws that allow the transfer of the deliv­
ery rights 
The buyer of a TOR gains two potential benefits from the TOR: (1) a 
patronage right to deliver a specified amount ofproduction to the coopera­
tive marketing pool and (2) a right to share in the marketing pool net 
proceeds based on the proportion of the total marketing pool that the TOR 
represents. These two benefits give a potential patronage value to the 
TOR. The seller of a TOR receives patronage value for the TOR that is 
independent of the redemption value of the cooperative's stock. 
Although TOR sellers were not interviewed, discussions with buyers 
indicated five possible reasons for offering a TOR for sale. First, the member 
wished to retire; second, land was being sold for non-farm use; third, a 
grower wished to change crop mix; fourth, a financially troubled grower 
needed to liqUidate some assets; and five, the cooperative had expanded 
the base pool and had issued pro rata share in the form ofTORs. Perennial 
crop growers -awning land fUlly planted sold these TORs rather than pur­
chase additional land. During the fieldwork, contact was made with an 
individual who had assembled several small TORs and resold them as a 
single unit. 
An important distinction is that cooperative membership results in coop­
erative stock ownership, while TOR ownership results in the patronage 
right to delivery commodity to the marketing pool and share in the net 
proceeds of that pool. Thus, it is the TOR that reflects the value of coopera­
tive patronage, not cooperative stock ownership. 
TOR value can be separated into two distinct components. The first 
component reflects the value of delivering commodity to the marketing 
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pool and is associated with the benefits a producermight derive from better 
coordination between production and marketing due to the existence of 
the cooperative (Shaffer 1987). Coordination includes a long-term contrac­
tual obligation to accept and market a commodity and other terms of 
trade developed and monitored by a grower-elected board of directors. 
This benefit was referred to as the "home for production" benefit by almost 
all of the cooperative members that were interviewed. This is in essence 
an "insurance value" for the TDR. 
The second benefit reflects the value ofpayments made from the market­
ing pool (net proceeds paid to the member) above those that would be 
achievable from alternative buyers. This is termed the "premium return 
value" of the TDR.2 A TDR can achieve market value by providing either 
or both of the above benefits to members. 
It is hypothesized that existence of a TDR value, due to either or both 
of the above benefits, is a function of industry structure, the cooperative's 
competitive conduct in the industry, the behavior of the cooperative rela­
tive to its membership and marketing pool policies, and an individual 
producer's response to marketing risk and uncertainty. Industry structure 
is concerned with location, number, and relative size of firms in the indus­
try. Cooperative competitive conduct in the industry refers to how aggres­
sively the cooperative behaves relative to its competitors. That is, does 
the cooperative behave in an aggressively competitive or passive non­
competitive manner relative to other firms in the industry? 
The cooperative marketing pool/membership policy is related to the 
issue of open or closed marketing pools and open or closed membership. 
For ease of explanation, we define two types of pool/membership situa­
tions. Open pool and open membership allow the addition ofnewmembers 
and their production to the cooperative pool and/or allow existing mem­
bers to increase their delivery to the cooperative marketing pool. A closed 
membership and closed pool preclude any additional production being 
added to the cooperative marketing pool in the short run. 
An individual producer's response to marketing risk and uncertainty is 
the final parameter to be determined. The basic problem facing producers 
is how to coordinate their economic activity in an uncertain world given 
that, for most agricultural production, there exists significant capital and 
market risk. We define the producer's problem as one ofmaximizing utility, 
given risk and uncertainty in the decision-making environment. Specific 
risks faced by the producer would include the basic production risks of 
yield and cost variability and the marketing risks of price variability and 
market coordination activities (market access, terms of trade, payment 
reliability, etc.). 
The objective function is for the producer to maximize expected utility 
of farm income (Halter and Dean 1971; Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker 
1977). This involves determination of a producer's utility function with 
respect to expected net farm income and the variances and covariances 
associated with different production and/or marketing choices. The port­
folio of choices may be limited by agronomic, financial, and/or institu­
tional factors. 
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Figure 1 illustrates one possible utility function3 for an individual pro­
ducer making decisions concerning the purchase of a TDR. It can be used 
to demonstrate that the purchase of a TDR can increase a producer's 
expected utility from either the benefit of a "premium return value" or 
an "insurance value." Point 0 can be considered the initial farm income 
position for a producer. The horizontal axis then can be scaled to represent 
gains or a reduction in net farm income. 
First, consider the individual producer who is contemplating the pur­
chase of a TDR for its insurance value. This insurance value is associated 
with the marketing risks faced by the producer. These market risks include 
opportunistic behavior by lOFs; transaction cost reduction associated with 
search, negotiation, and enforcement costs of marketing contracts; and 
market access restrictions. A producer located at point 0 can purchase 
a TDR for a price of OA, or not buy a TDR with a probability p of net farm 
loss OE, or a probability I-p of no loss and remaining at point O. The 
utility associated with bUying a TDR (as an insurance policy) at a price of 
OA is read off the utility curve at point B or utility level H. The disutility 
Figure I.-Utility Function Showing Ranges of Both Decreasing and 
Increasing Marginal Utility 
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associated with not purchasing a TOR and incurring a loss is read off 
chord OF at point C and utility level O. The chord OF represents the 
expected disutility of not purchasing a TOR, which has two possible out­
comes, either OEwith probability p or 0 with a probability of I-p. Probabil­
ity p then represents the proportion of the total distance OE at which to 
read offthe expected utility ofOE from chord OF. Using the above notation, 
if p = 1/3 and OA is 1/3 the distance from 0 to E, then the utility of not 
buying the insurance would be 1/3 the distance from 0 to F. The above 
producer would clearly purchase the TOR since utility level H is preferred 
to utility level O. 
Now consider the individual producer who is contemplating purchasing 
a TOR with the expectation that net farm income can be increased due to 
the purchase of a TOR There is assumed to be some probability p that 
(1) the cooperative can provide to its members higher returns on their 
production than that which would be available from alternative firms and 
(2) a probability I-p that the purchase of the TOR will result in the loss 
of net farm income due to the initial price paid for the TOR There are two 
possible alternatives open to the producer: (1) remain at point 0, or (2) 
buy the TOR with a probability of p that the outcome will be an increase 
of net farm income of OM or a probability of I-p that a reduction of net 
farm income ofOAwill result. Analogous to the situation presented above, 
the utility of purchasing the TOR is read off the chord BK. Chord BK 
represents the two possible outcomes of purchasing a TOR The disutility 
of a possible reduction in net farm income is H. The utility of the potential 
gain in net farm income is L. The utility of purchasing the TOR is 0', 
which is on the chord BK and is the weighted utility of H and L. Clearly, 
in this case the producer would buy the TOR based on this utility function 
because utility 0' is greater than utility O. 
Producers are not precluded from purchasing a TOR that covers only a 
portion of their production. A producer who has a utility function such 
as shown in figure 1 could maximize expected utility by simultaneously 
purchasing an "insurance value"TORfor part ofthe production and "spec­
ulating" on the open market with the remainder of the production. It 
should also be noted that utility functions may take on other functional 
forms such as linear (risk neutral) or cubic (risk preferring), which will 
produce different results. The most common form is concave or risk averse 
throughout. 
Transferable Delivery Right Valuation 
Earlier it was hypothesized that TOR value, reflecting either an insur­
ance value and/or a premium value, was a function of market structure, 
cooperative competitive conduct in the industry, the type of marketing 
pool, membership policies followed by the cooperative, and individual pro­
ducer response to marketing risk. The above has demonstrated that, given 
a specified utility function and the probability of an opportunity to add to 
net farm income or diminish the potential loss of net farm income, an 
individual producer could maximize expected utility by purchasing a TOR 
This section ofthe paper addresses the remaining issues thatwere hypoth­
esized to be important in determining whether a TOR would have value 
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to an individual producer. This section postulates a plausible industry 
structure, cooperative competitive conduct, and marketing pool and mem­
bership policies that would lead a producer to believe that the probability 
of TDR value is positive. 
Four TDR valuation cases are presented below. These cases are not 
intended to exhaust all situations in which TDR can have value but rather 
to provide situations in which TDRs could have value to a producer. Each 
ofthe cases presents differing combinations of industry structure, cooper­
ative competitive conduct, and cooperative marketing pool and member­
ship policies. The cases will be differentiated by the competitiveness or 
non-competitiveness of the commodity procurement market, the final 
product market, market conduct of the cooperative. and its marketing 
pool and membership policies. 
Case 1 
1. Procurement Market: Competitive 
2. Product Market:	 Competitive 
3. Cooperative Conduct: Competitive 
4. Pool/Membership Policy: Open/Open 
The competitive nature of the markets and the cooperative conduct 
would result in firms in the industry receiving a product price that just 
covers the industry long-run average cost (LRAC). The net proceeds that 
a cooperative member would receive in this case would approximate those 
received by non-members. Ifcooperative net proceeds were less than those 
received by non-members. the cooperative could expect to lose members 
and subsequently exit the industry. 
Delivery rights, and thus TDR, have no insurance or premium return 
value either to existing members or non-members. This is because either 
can produce a commodity with the certain belief that there will be a willing 
buyer at harvest time at the industry average price. 
Case 2 
1. Procurement Market: Competitive 
2. Product Market:	 Non-Competitive 
3. Cooperative Conduct: Oligopolistic 
4.	 Pool/Membership Policy: Closed/Closed 
This case is similar to a large food processor that buys raw commodity 
in a competitive environment and has obtained some oligopolistic power 
in the product market through brand name development or market share. 
The product market is non-competitive. One cooperative in the study is 
approximated by this case. 
The cooperative behaves as an oligopolist, and the remaining firms are 
assumed to conduct themselves in a competitive manner selling undiffer­
entiated products or having relatively small market shares. Cooperative 
membership and marketing pool policy restrict delivery to the oligopolistic 
profit-maximizing level necessitating a closed pool/closed membership 
policy. This situation offers a potential for the TDR to have value. The net 
proceeds allocated to the individual members would exceed those that 
could be obtained from alternative firms. Thus. the probability of produc­
ers receiving a premium return on their production is significant. 
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The TDRvalue in this case is the capitalized value of the premium return 
value, which is defined as expected difference in the total net proceeds 
received from the cooperative less the opportunity cost of marketing 
through the next best market alternative available to the producer. This 
can be considered the value of production with and without the coopera­
tive. 
The valuation of the TDR in this case is similar to the valuation of IOF 
stock given the following assumptions. First, assume that the objective of 
the cooperative is to maximize the premium return component of its net 
proceeds and that, due to its non-profit status, it will distribute all net 
proceeds less any equity contribution to its patrons. Second, the variance 
of the net proceeds received from the cooperative (allocated net proceeds) 
is the same or smaller than payments that could be received from other 
firms in the industry. 
The TDRvalue in this case is the capitalized value ofthe premium return 
value and can be calculated as follows: 
TDR(O) = EPR(l)/Ks-g 
where TDR(O) is the current value of a transferable delivery right, EPR(l) 
is the expected premium return value at the end of period one, Ks is the 
opportunity cost of capital, and g is the expected growth rate of the TDR.4 
This relatively simple growth model reflects the comparative static situa­
tion with perfect information. It is not clear that potential buyers or sellers 
of TDRs who were interviewed had knowledge of the growth model or 
explicitly used such a model to determine TDRvalue (price), but "coopera­
tive strength" in the marketplace and potential returns based on that 
strength ranked second in importance as a reason for purchasing a TDR. 
The survey results also indicated that some buyers ofTDRs recognized 
a potential growth rate for the TDR and recognized there was an opportu­
nity cost ofcapital in purchasing a TDR. Thus, producers took into account 
the variables included in the growth model when determining TDR value. 
An important factor that stood out in the anecdotal information from the 
grower surveys was the wide range in beliefs expressed regarding the 
variability of the EPR. Some producers extrapolated from a time series 
going back as much as twenty years while younger and more cautious 
producers relied on more recent results. Due to the small sample size, 
these results cannot be statistically verified; however, there is a strong 
indication that a distribution of expected premium return values exists 
in the supply region of the cooperative. 
The derived demand for the TDRs becomes the capitalized value of these 
expectations aggregated over the distribution of optimists and pessimists 
in the supply area. Since TDRs are not publicly advertised, the bringing 
together of buyers and sellers (containing both optimists and pessimists) 
in such an informal market contains an element of chance. The market 
exchange in many instances is the local gathering place for the area's 
producers-typically, the rural coffee shop. It is in this setting that the 
"reasonableness" of the TDR selling price is discussed and price discovery 
takes place. 
9 Valuation of Transferable Delivery Rights/Moore and Noel 
Divergences in the price of a TDR for a specific cooperative do exist in 
these markets. This is partially explained by the fact that the supply area 
for any cooperative can be quite large and. although within one small 
geographical area there may exist a consensus on TDR price. there can 
be differences in TDR price among local geographical areas. This would 
indicate less than perfect information within these secondary markets. 
and the transaction costs of obtaining better information is perceived to 
be quite high. 
Case 3 
Procurement Market: 
Product Market: 
Cooperative Conduct: 
Pool/Membership Policy: 
'\ 
Local Oligopsonistic 
Competitive 
Non-Competitive in Procurement 
Closed/Closed 
This case is probably the most frequently observed of the cases to be 
presented here and closely resembles two of the cooperatives in this study. 
This situation occurs when a local production region has a large number 
of producers and a relatively small number of firms in the procurement 
market. An example would be a production area producing fruit or vegeta­
bles for local food processors. The food processors compete in regional or 
national product markets and are assumed to act in a competitive manner 
in those markets receiving like prices for their products. Entry into the 
local market is constrained by economies of scale barriers. 
In this case. the finished product has little. ifany product differentiation. 
The procurementmarket is dominated by the cooperative in the geographic 
sub-areas. but this dominance could be shared with a small number of 
IOFs. The primaryjustifications for forming the cooperativewere to capture 
economies of scale in processing and marketing. savings from vertical 
coordination. and to prevent the appropriation of quasi-economic rents 
by IOFs. 
Potential commodity supply to processors is assumed to be greater than 
commodity demand at a price that would cover long-run average cost. The 
crop must be harvested and processed qUickly or lose its value. High 
transportation cost precludes shipment to other processing areas. 
TDR valuation. under the conditions proposed above. can be divided 
into two distinct producer decisions. The first decision relates to the deter­
mination of how to market a perishable perennial crop. while the second 
relates to the whole-farm planning problem of choosing a portfolio mix of 
perishable and non-perishable annual crops to produce and market. 
Subcase 3A: TDR Valuation of a Perishable Perennial Crop 
Williamson (1981) notes that. as assets became more specialized or 
"specific," autonomous market contracting becomes a progreSSively less 
efficient means of allocating these assets. This is known as the asset fixity 
principle. This "principle" suggests that, as producer assets become more 
specific to an end use or product. the cost of transferring these assets to 
other uses becomes prohibitive. The cost may reflect the technical charac­
teristic of the asset itself. the spatial distribution of production. or poorly 
functioning factor markets. Producers owning these specialized assets will 
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continue to maintain them in their current use as long as their value in 
use exceeds their salvage value. 
A good example of this asset fixity problem is the production of a peren­
nial crop (trees, vines, etc.) in a specific geographic location where produc­
tion has required a large farm investment in trees, vines, or other fixed 
assets and requires specialized skills. The procurement market as speci­
fied in this case provides the necessary condition for the asset fixity princi­
ple to apply and would allow local processors to act in an opportunistic 
manner (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1986). 
Opportunistic behavior by processors can result in inefficient market 
coordination and cause producers to receive less than a competitive price 
for their output resulting in a situation where producers are in a position 
of severe income risk. This income risk can be viewed as an attempt by 
processors to appropriate a portion of the producers' quasi-economic rent. 
Whether this type of opportunistic behavior can be sustained over a long 
period of time is debatable; even in the short run, producers will attempt 
to defend against this opportunistic behavior. 
A number of remedies may be possible such as a producer bargaining 
association or vertical integration to form a processing/marketing cooper­
ative. This is especially true in markets where there are high sunk costs, 
a highly perishable product, and product demand is static or declining 
because existing processors have little concern about other IOFs entering 
the market. 
This market failure situation provides a strong economic and societal 
rationale for the formation of a vertically integrated open pool/open mem­
bership cooperative. Vertical integration removes the opportunity for 
exploitation and provides a dependable outlet for the area's producers. 
Assuming the cooperative receives the same market price for its products 
as the IOF processors, and that it operates in an economically efficient 
manner, it will return to the area's producers a competitive return on 
their cooperative investment. Additionally, producers may benefit from 
improvements in market coordination activities. These market coordina­
tion benefits can include better terms of trade, enhanced opportunity 
to capture the upper end of the total income payment distribution, and 
increased producer confidence that they will be treated in a fair and hon­
est manner. 
Terms of trade benefits result from the reduction in the search, negotia­
tion, and enforcement costs associated with establishinga market contract 
(Williamson 1981). The cooperative contract, unlike a typical IOF contract, 
has an indefinite length and doesn't have to be renegotiated every year. 
Contract cancellation is rare. Other favorable terms of trade may be offered 
such as cooperative assistance in handling off-quality production and 
providing logistics support. 
Cooperative marketing contracts often require the cooperative take the 
producer's total production. Since these contracts are written in terms of 
acres of production, the producer is assured an outlet for total production 
even in bumper crop years. These cooperatives maintain excess capacity 
or rent temporary storage in bumper crop years. Increasing marginal and 
average costs may result in lower per unit net returns, but the upper end 
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of the total income stream distribution, due to increased yield, will not be 
truncated. This is a substantial benefit because many IOF contracts in 
the western United States are written for a specific quantity of production 
(tons, cwt., etc.), and when high yields occur, the producer must find a 
market for the additional production or see it spoil. 5 
The trust and confidence benefit comes with the knowledge that the 
cooperative is a user-owned and user-controlled entity. Members can exert 
political influence through the board of directors to be assured that they 
are receiving complete market information, that allocated net proceeds 
accurately reflect market conditions, and that every member is being 
treated equitably. These market coordination benefits are difficult to quan­
tify but collectively can result in a reduction in the variability of pro­
ducer income. 
Only by closing its pool and membership can a cooperative create a 
secondary market where its insurance value can be capitalized into a TOR 
value. However, this action contributes to the same limited market access, 
asset fixity, and market coordination problems that the cooperative was 
originally formed to eliminate. The most often stated reason given by coop­
eratives for closing their marketing pool and membership is to provide 
their members with a competitive return comparable to that paid by IOFs. 
Cooperative closure ofits marketing pool/membership also provides the 
opportunity for existing cooperative members to capture the cooperative's 
insurancevalue through a TORmarket. In this case, cooperative patronage 
now has a capitalizable insurance value that is a competitive "home for 
production" value. This competitive "home for production" value is derived 
from the limitation ofopportunistic exploitation ofIOF processors through 
vertical integration and the benefits ofimprovedmarket coordination activ­
ities. The choices faced by non-members are to either form an additional 
cooperative, negotiate a long-term contract with the IOF processors, or 
buy a TOR from an existing cooperative member. 
Subcase 3B: TDR Valuation of a Perishable Annual Crop 
The producer in a localized production area is assumed to have the 
flexibility to produce a number of crops. For example, the potential crop 
mix could include perishable processing vegetables, field crops, seed 
crops, and perennials. The assumptions concerning market structure and 
market supply and demand remain the same. Production of perishable 
processing vegetables is limited either by IOF processor production con­
tracts or a cooperative delivery right. The issue ofasset fixity for producers 
choosing to grow perishable processingvegetable crops is not as important 
as in the case ofperennials because production typically is not associated 
with large sunk investment costs or the use of specialized assets. The 
asset (perishable crop) does not become specialized until after planting. 
The producer's problem is choosing which crop or combination of crops 
to produce when there is limited market access. Determination of the 
optimal cropping mix is known as the whole-farm planning problem (Ander­
son, Dillon, and Hardaker 1977). The objective is to find a cropping pattern 
that maximizes expected utility, given the producer's risk preferences rela­
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tive to expected farm income, and the variances and covariances associ­
ated with the production and marketing mix choices. 
This choice set can be limited by agronomic, operating capital, and 
market access considerations. Agronomic considerations might include 
crop rotations necessary for yield loss protection or physical input limita­
tions (e.g., water availability). Limited operating capital will affect ability 
of producers to take certain production or marketing risks (Moore and 
Snyder 1969). 
The valuation of a TOR for a perishable annual crop in this case is 
similar to that of a perishable perennial but emphasizes market access 
and the terms of trade security value of the cooperative. Producers of 
annual crops can adjust their crop mix much easier than those producing 
perennials, thus eliminating the asset fixity problem. Thus, the threat to 
the processors that producers will shift to alternative crops will limit their 
opportunistic behavior. Market access and favorable terms of trade provide 
the TOR value in this market situation. Market access allows producers 
to grow processing vegetable crops rather than forage, seed, or other crops 
that can have lower expected income andlor greater variance of income. 
This same market access may also provide for a decrease in the variance 
of the farm income stream when income covariances are negative. The 
benefits from the cooperative's terms of trade are similar to those for a 
perennial. Risk of contract cancellation is zero as long as cooperative 
membership is maintained. Finally, many growers feel more confident as 
part of a cooperative. They tend to worry less about the disposition and 
payment for their crop than they would with an IOF processor. Again, 
many of these benefits are hard to quantity, but all are sources of value 
for a TOR. 
The anecdotal information collected in the survey strongly indicated 
that risk aversion was an important motive for purchasing a TOR. The 
result compares favorably with the discussion relating to figure 1. That 
is, a producer has an incentive to purchase a TOR ifthere exists a probabil­
ity that it will reduce potential losses in net farm income. TOR buyers, 
when questioned, indicated some knowledge of the distribution of net 
returns paid by the cooperative. This revealed their expectation concerning 
the mean and variance ofthe distribution. No direct elicitations ofproducer 
expectations were made, but a few growers expressed the opinion that, 
for their industry, this was a bell shaped curve but skewed to the right. 
That is, there is a long thin tail for high prices. The probability of receiving 
a high price is very lowbut not zero. Some non-risk-averse growers market 
to independent processors on the chance of achieving an occasional very 
large payoff. TOR buyers appeared most concerned about the lower end 
of this distribution, the impact of zero or negative net returns on their 
farm incomes due to their inability to sell the crop if they produced as 
independents. 
The purchase of a TOR would indicate that producers are risk averse. 
Most buyers interviewed in this situation indicated that they considered 
the purchase of a TOR as a single cost of production to insure a home for 
their production. In a market for contingencies and insurance, it appeared 
that buyers were, in part, paying a one-time premium to obtain business 
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interruption insurance. Thus, the more risk-averse buyers were willing to 
pay a premium to avoid receiving the low end of the income distribution 
by guaranteeing a home for their production. The cooperative home would 
always pay a positive return, although pooling ofcommoditywould prevent 
the producer from capturing the upper end ofthe crop income distribution. 
The price paid for TDRs in this case can be hypothesized to vary depend­
ing on the risk averseness of the individual producers in the local procure­
ment market. As previously stated, no direct elicitation of TDR buyers' 
utility functions were made; however, the survey data available indicated 
a wide range of utility functions were present in the population, and risk 
averse and risk neutral individuals seemed to dominate. This observation 
is supported by previous work in this area (e.g., Lin, Dean, and Moore 
1978). 
If there is a wide range of utility functions in the population, buyers 
with the steepest sloped utility functions would be willing to pay higher 
insurance premiums (the TDR price) to avoid a possible large loss in net 
farm income. For example, results of the survey indicated the maximum 
price paid for a TDR for a perishable perennial was 125 percent of a single 
year's gross sales value at an average yield. The average price paid for a 
TDR to the same cooperative was about 40 percent of one year's crop 
value. That a very risk averse individual will maximize utility by paying 
an insurance premium that exceeds the expected loss has been demon­
strated byAnderson, Dillon, and Hardaker (1977). The actual price negoti­
ated between a buyer and seller of TORs in this market is the result of a 
seller offering to give up a TOR based on price discovery, having met a 
risk averse buyer whose willingness to pay is equal or greater than the 
offer price. Discussions with buyers indicated that actual bargaining over 
price occurred only about 10 percent of the time. Ninety percent of the 
buyers accepted the first price offered by the seller. 
Case 4 
Procurement Market: Oligopsonistic 
Product Market: Oligopolistic 
Cooperative Conduct: Non-Competitive 
Pool/Membership Policy: Closed/Closed 
This case is the opposite of case one. The cooperative has gained some 
oligopoly power in its product market. Again, this is similar to a large IOF 
food processor that has gained consumer allegiance to its national brand 
name(s) and/or has gained a large productmarket share. The procurement 
market is assumed to have relatively few IOF processors acting as price 
followers to the cooperative (i.e., marketing similar products to that of 
the cooperative) or to have a large number of IOF firms, each marketing 
undifferentiated products. 
The closed pool/membership policy of the cooperative and the assumed 
market structure allow the cooperative to maximize oligopolistic profit. 
Cooperative members will receive above-competitive-market returns on 
their production. Non-cooperative members will market their production 
to the cooperative's IOF competitors under short-term contracts or in the 
spot market. 
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If the IOF competitors are price followers to the cooperative, few in 
number, and significant barriers to entry exist, they can attempt to act 
opportunistically if asset fixity is present. Non-cooperative members can 
expect to receive a competitive or less than competitive return for produc­
tion in this situation, depending on the degree of asset fixity and the 
presence of opportunistic behavior. If a large number of IOF competitors, 
each marketing undifferentiated products, are active in the procurement 
market, producers selling to these firms can expect to receive the competi­
tive market return associated with those undifferentiated markets. 
The TOR value in the two situations described above can be either a 
premium return value or both a premium return value and an insurance 
value. If there is an atomistic IOF competitive fringe in the procurement 
market, the TOR value is the capitalized premium return value of the 
cooperative, and if there are relatively few IOFs, then there exists the 
potential for the TOR to reflect the capitalized value of both the premium 
return value and the insurance value ofthe cooperative. The transfer price 
for the TORs in this case is resolved when a seller offering a TOR at 
the local market consensus price meets a buyer whose present value 
expectations of receiving a premium return from the cooperative, or both 
a premium return and a insurance value, are equal to or greater than the 
price of the TOR being offered. 
The market structure and cooperative conduct situation where both 
premium return and "home for production" values are presented were not 
observed. It is likely that, if it were, non-cooperative producers would 
attempt through collective bargaining, government intervention, or by 
forming a new cooperative, to eliminate these opportunistic behavior or 
market access problems. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The major objective of this study was to evaluate the sources of value 
attributed to marketing cooperative delivery rights or contracts. Based on 
our limited data, the necessary conditions for TORs to have value appear 
to be (1) potential buyers must have a positive prior probability that the 
TOR will improve their net farm income and wealth position, (2) there 
must be willing sellers, (3) TOR market transaction costs must be less 
than the value of the TOR, and (4) cooperatives must have closed pool and 
closed membership policies. Sufficient conditions would include (1) the 
presence of market failure due to barriers to entry, economies of scale or 
vertical integration providing the cooperative with a competitive advan­
tage, and (2) the presence of a premium return value and/or an insur­
ance value. 
The supply of TORs initially comes from a cooperative developing a 
delivery contract programwith the expressed intent ofgiving existingmem­
bers an asset that provides them the right to deliver to the cooperative 
marketing pool and share in the net revenues generated from that pool. 
The cooperative can gain three benefits by developing a TOR program: (1) 
it can generate equity from the initial offering of the TORs, (2) it can gain 
continued equity contributions from cooperative members who are holders 
ofTORs, and (3) it can provide its members with a marketable asset that 
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reflects the current patronage value of the cooperative, which can exceed 
its stock value. The supply ofTDRs in the secondary market comes from 
cooperative members who eitherwant to reduce the amount of commodity 
being delivered to the cooperative or who want to exit the cooperative. The 
initial supply ofTDRs can be increased through actions of the cooperative 
through either a desire to expand the marketing pool and/or acquire 
additional equity capital. 
The demand for TDRs is a derived demand and is valued based on the 
right to deliver a particular quantity and quality of a commodity to the 
cooperative and to share in the net proceeds of the marketing pool. The 
demand reflects the expectation of producers that TDR ownership will, 
with some degree of certainty, increase net farm income and/or reduce 
the risk associated with potential losses in net farm income. The disutility 
assigned to the expectation is a function of the risk averseness of the 
individual producer. Most producers, in market situations where the coop­
erative generated net returns greater than the industry average, were able 
to translate their expectations into a TDR bid price. Risk averse producers 
of perishable crops were willing to pay a one-time premium to prevent net 
farm income loss due to perceived market coordination problems. 
The market price of the TDR does not appear to reflect the appreciation 
in the value of cooperative tangible assets due to inflation. This is related 
to the non-profit nature of the cooperative, which passes through all of 
the net proceeds from its marketing operations. However, any change in 
cooperative assets that affects the mean or variance of the net proceeds 
will be capitalized in the TDR value. 
The policy implications of the market for transferable delivery rights are 
significant. As indicated earlier, the conditions for a TDR to have value 
imply a less than ideal market structure. This brings into question whether 
or not cooperatives with TDR programs and their attendant provisions 
(e.g., closed pool and closed membership) should receive the same societal 
and legal considerations given to more competitive cooperatives thatmain­
tain open membership and open pool policies. 
This study indicates that some producers operating under a cooperative 
form of business are capable of generating added utility and receiving the 
rewards. If cooperatives cannot pay returns to their members equal to 
that paid by IOFs, the cooperative will have failed to provide the "yardstick" 
measure to the industry. That is, it is possible, ifcooperatives are prevented 
from closing membership or limiting and closing the size of their marketing 
pool, they may be placed at a competitive disadvantage to IOFs and will 
eventually be eliminated from the industry. 
Further research needs lie in better measurement of risk and producers' 
attitudes toward risk and analysis of how cooperatives can mitigate risk 
for their members. Better knowledge of the variance and other moments 
about the mean of net returns in both single and multi-commodity pool 
cooperatives may lead to improved risk management strategies. 
Notes 
1. Throughout the paper we use the word "member" to indicate an individual 
producer who is currently delivering a commodity to the cooperative marketing 
pool. 
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2. Cotterill (1987) discusses cooperative valuation in the context of core versus 
global values. He discusses a core value as that which the cooperative would 
command if it were in a competitive equilibrium, while the global value is the 
amount cooperative members would be willing to pay rather than to do without 
the cooperative. A TDR would have a premium value if global value is in excess 
of core value. 
3. Figure 1 is adopted from Halter and Dean 1971 and is based on the work 
originally done by Friedman and Savage (1974). We assume that such a function 
exists and can be specified for individual producers. There exist some empirical 
studies that provide examples of such utility functions for farm managers (e.g., 
Lin, Dean, and Moore 1974; Binswanger 1980; and King and Oamek 1983). It 
should be noted here that only under specific assumptions will the maximization 
of expected utility and the maximization of expected farm income lead to the same 
set of producer decisions. 
4. This is a restatement of the Gordon Growth model, which is discussed in 
most intermediate finance texts (e.g., Copeland and Weston 1988). Although used 
to determine the value of IOF stock. it provides a rationale for determining the 
premium value of a TDR when there is a history of the cooperative providing a 
return to its members above that which would be paid by alternative firms in the 
same industry. 
5. The California Tomato Growers Association estimates that 70 percent of IOF 
production contracts are on a tonnage basis. 
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